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THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE SPILL’S IMPACT ON THE GAP IN INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF OIL POLLUTION FROM FIXED 
PLATFORMS 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, the international community learned that the Gulf of 
Mexico had endured1 what would ultimately become the world’s largest oil 
spill in history2 and what President Barack Obama would describe as “the 
worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.”3 British Petroleum’s 
(“BP”) Deepwater Horizon oilrig had exploded off the coast of Louisiana, 
killing eleven crewmembers.4 By the time BP was able to engineer a successful 
means to cap the rig, eighty-six days had passed since the Deepwater Horizon 
began to expel oil into the environment,5 and approximately 185 million 
gallons of crude oil had escaped into the Gulf of Mexico and the surrounding 
waters.6 Oil leaked continuously from BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig for 
approximately three months, causing extensive damage to the environment and 
devastating Gulf Coast tourism and fishing industries, especially those of 
Florida and Louisiana.7 
Although the Deepwater Horizon exploded off the coast of the United 
States, hundreds of miles from any other country and with its greatest effects 
on the economies and environments of the Gulf Coast states, oil spills have 
traditionally been international concerns.8 Historically, due to sea currents’ 
abilities to easily transport oil slicks from their origin to neighboring countries’ 
 
 1 Kate Galbraith, Gap in Rules on Oil Spills from Wells, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 17, 2010, at 20, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/business/energy-environment/17green.html. 
 2 Justin Gillis & Leslie Kaufman, Oil Spill Calculations Stir Debate on Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2010, at A16. 
 3 Justin Gillis, Where Gulf Spill Might Place on the Roll of Great Disasters, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010, 
at A1. 
 4 Robbie Brown, Official Denies BP Put Cost Ahead of Safety at Oil Rig, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at 
A12. 
 5 Campbell Robertson & Henry Fountain, BP Caps Its Leaking Well, Stopping the Oil After 86 Days, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A1. The rig was finally capped on July 15, 2010. Id. 
 6 Elizabeth Wilson, Oil Spill’s Size Swells, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS, Sept. 27, 2010, at 14.  
 7 Id. 
 8 Galbraith, supra note 1. 
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shores, states have recognized that oil spills involve important international 
responsibilities concerning economic, environmental, and diplomatic 
relations.9 For example, in 2009, a Thai-owned oil well leaked off the coast of 
Australia, and caused a twenty-five mile by eighty-five mile oil slick that had 
significant impacts on both Indonesia and East Timor.10 To direct the 
international prevention and regulation of such international oil spills, states 
have implemented multiple regional agreements and global conventions 
through the formation of the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”).11 
While an extensive body of international law concerning oil pollution12 has 
emerged, a significant gap still exists in the international regulation of such 
pollution. The current multilateral maritime conventions apply “primarily or 
exclusively to accidents involving tankers,”13 failing to take into account 
pollution from fixed platforms like the Deepwater Horizon. Moreover, while 
two global conventions—addressed below in Part II.A.1—met in 1992 to 
address the growing international implications and dangers of oil spills caused 
by tankers,14 the international community has yet to establish a global 
convention that specifically addresses the dangers of, and possible effective 
regulations for, oil spills from fixed platforms.15 
The conventions currently in force are therefore not applicable to accidents, 
like the Deepwater Horizon disaster, which involve an explosion of or leak 
from a fixed, offshore oil platform.16 Because “tankers move across 
international boundaries all the time” and “platforms remain fixed in place,” 
strict regulation of fixed platforms on an international scale has not yet been 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Meraiah Foley, As Oil Enriches Australia, Spill Is Seen as a Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at 
A6; see also Galbraith, supra note 1. For example, the spill “seriously affected” Indonesian fishermen when 
the oil slick entered into their fishing grounds and negatively impacted their livelihood through a resulting lack 
of catch. East Timor Wants Compo for Oil Spill Fallout, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2009, 7:15 PM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/11/05/2734579.htm. 
 11 Galbraith, supra note 1. 
 12 See infra Part I for the relevant conventions and agreements. 
 13 Galbraith, supra note 1; see also Yee Huang, International Law Implications of the BP Oil Spill, 
CPRBLOG (June 9, 2010), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=FBF393AA-EE0A-FF0C-
695B9BA163B50BDB. 
 14 International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature Jan. 15, 1993, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter 1992 
CLC]; International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature Jan. 
15, 1993, 1953 U.N.T.S. 373 [hereinafter 1992 Fund]; see also Galbraith, supra note 1. 
 15 Galbraith, supra note 1. 
 16 See id.; infra Part II.A.1. 
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successfully achieved.17 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”)18 comes closest to regulating platform pollution by addressing 
fixed platforms in its statutory language,19 but its strength, addressed in Part 
I.B below, mainly rests in its “framework for international cooperation and its 
attempt to harmonize standards,”20 rather than in its implementation of a 
uniform, international liability standard. 
In order to compensate for this lack of codified regulation of fixed platform 
pollution, operators in the oil and shipping industries have created “private 
compensation regimes” such as the International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Funds (“IOPC”) and the Offshore Pollution Liability Association (“OPOL”).21 
These operators have voluntarily bound themselves to regulations implemented 
by private compensation regimes, which ensure that violators are held strictly 
liable for any oil pollution emitted by their equipment.22 IOPC and OPOL 
collect damages from the liable party and detail in their agreements exactly 
how the injured parties may receive compensation.23 Importantly, however, the 
agreements of both IOPC and OPOL place caps on the level of compensation 
that the regimes can collect per party, per incident, and per year.24 Therefore, if 
a party to IOPC or OPOL were to cause a spill that cost more than its relevant, 
private compensation regime’s total liability limits, not all injured claimants 
would be able to obtain their due compensations. 
As is explained below, the current collection scheme of due compensations 
for such accidents leaves victims injured by oil pollution at the mercy of either 
private compensation regimes or those limited, international agreements 
 
 17 See Galbraith, supra note 1. 
 18 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 19 Id. art. 194, para. 3. 
 20 See Huang, supra note 13. 
 21 See Introduction—The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, INT’L OIL POLLUTION 
COMPENSATION FUNDS, http://www.iopcfund.org/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) [hereinafter IOPC 
Introduction]; About OPOL, OPOL—OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIABILITY ASS’N LTD, http://www.opol.org.uk/ 
about.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011); SECRETARIAT OF THE INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE—EXPLANATORY NOTE 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter EXPLANATORY NOTE], available at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf. 
 22 See IOPC Introduction, supra note 21; About OPOL, supra note 21; EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 
21, at 1. 
 23 See IOPC Introduction, supra note 21; About OPOL, supra note 21; EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 
21, at 1. 
 24 See IOPC Introduction, supra note 21; About OPOL, supra note 21; EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 
21, at 1. 
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currently in effect.25 This arrangement is deficient for two reasons. First, 
compensation caps of private compensation regimes fail to encapsulate fully 
the damages incurred by these disasters, forcing innocent victims in the 
surrounding international environment to bear the remaining costs of repair 
and revitalization.26 Second, the current international agreements fail to 
address adequately pollution from fixed platforms.27 Therefore, it is important 
to examine how best to fill this gap in international law so that those most 
responsible and best able to absorb the cost of the accident will be held liable 
for such damages; otherwise, the innocent consumer will be forced to shoulder 
this undue burden. 
In an effort to propose a solution that would alleviate this inadequacy, this 
Comment evaluates this “gap” in international law and the degree to which it is 
filled by private compensation regimes such as IOPC and OPOL. To this end, 
this Comment examines the Deepwater Horizon disaster’s impact on the 
current international agreements controlling oil pollution. As the largest oil 
spill in history, the Deepwater Horizon explosion has put to the test the 
effectiveness of compensation caps enacted by private compensation regimes 
and reemphasized the importance of enacting a global convention on oil 
pollution from fixed platforms. This Comment also examines the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster’s impact on both private compensation regimes’ regulations 
and liability caps, and on the international community’s recent reevaluation of 
the importance of a global convention specifically addressing fixed platforms. 
This Comment then argues that a global treaty—which addresses the 
international implications of oil spills from fixed platforms and assigns liability 
in a manner similar to those enforced by international conventions on tanker 
pollution and similar, regional agreements—is the most logical solution to fill 
this gap in international law and to create uniform, consistent liabilities 
regulating such environmental disasters. 
Part I summarizes the current status of relevant international laws that 
govern both tanker and fixed platform oil spills, including the Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships28 and UNCLOS. Part II provides a 
 
 25 See infra Parts I–II. 
 26 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 27 See infra Part I. 
 28  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 184, modified by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships of November 2, 1973, opened for signature Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter 
MARPOL 73/78].  
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general overview of the two private compensation regimes mentioned above—
IOPC and OPOL—examines the changes that have been made to these regimes 
over the decades, and questions the motivations behind these changes. Part III 
analyzes the Deepwater Horizon disaster’s impact on both IOPC and OPOL 
and their current, established frameworks for regulating the international 
effects of oil pollution. It indicates that the Deepwater Horizon disaster has 
already affected the agreements of OPOL, and has begun to alter opinions 
concerning the need for a global treaty on fixed platform pollution. In addition, 
Part III argues that the routine increases in the compensation caps that occur 
after every major oil disaster in private compensation regimes simply do not 
effectively regulate pollution by fixed platforms. It instead proposes that, in 
light of the extensive Deepwater Horizon spill, a treaty—global in 
jurisdiction—that imposes strict liability on operators of fixed platforms is 
necessary to prevent, regulate, and maintain liability for such pollution. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW CURRENTLY 
GOVERNING OIL POLLUTION 
To effectively evaluate the Deepwater Horizon disaster’s impact on 
international law, it is necessary to first understand the legal environment in 
which this disaster occurred. Therefore, an examination of the relevant 
international law currently addressing oil pollution from both ships and tankers 
follows. 
A. The International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
In 1973, the IMO promoted the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, and, in 1978, modified this convention with the 
Protocol of 1978 (collectively, “MARPOL 73/78”).29 MARPOL 73/78 
prohibits all “oil tankers, cruise ships, general cargo and container vessels, 
tugs, ferries, yachts and small pleasure craft” from releasing substances that 
would pollute the marine environment.30 Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 regulates 
the discharge of oil and allows a port state, upon detecting a violation, to detain 
 
 29 Id.; see also John R. Lethbridge, MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships) (Transp., Water & Urban Dev. Dep’t, World Bank, Transport No. PS-4, 1991), available 
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRANSPORT/Resources/336291-1119275973157/td-ps4.pdf. 
 30 See Lethbridge, supra note 29. 
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the violating ship until it is found to comply with MARPOL 73/78.31 
Currently, 150 states are parties to MARPOL 73/78.32 
Enforcement of MARPOL 73/78 has proven difficult, however, because 
this convention lacks provisions that specifically detail how a port state may 
detain an offending ship.33 Additionally, certain jurisdictional issues further 
attenuate MARPOL 73/78’s enforceability.34 For example, port and coastal 
states affected by a violating ship merely have the authority to inform a flag 
state of its ship’s violation; flag states, however, are averse to prosecuting their 
own ships for MARPOL violations.35 IMO has recognized this significant 
ineffectiveness, as is witnessed in flag states’ lack of convictions of reported 
ships.36 Therefore, due to its weak enforceability provisions, MARPOL 73/78 
does not provide a strong mechanism under which international oil disasters 
like the Deepwater Horizon can be regulated. 
B. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
In addition to MARPOL, states are also bound by UNCLOS, which is 
directly applicable to disasters like the Deepwater Horizon spill. In 1994, 
UNCLOS came into force.37 To date, 156 countries have ratified the treaty.38 
The United States is not a party to the convention,39 but many of UNCLOS’ 
 
 31 See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28, Annex I, reg. 4, para. 3(d); see also Rebecca Becker, Note, 
MARPOL 73/78: An Overview in International Environmental Enforcement, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
625, 628–29 (1998). 
 32 See INT’L MAR. ORG., STATUS OF CONVENTIONS SUMMARY (2011), http://www.imo.org/About/ 
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Summary%20of%20Status.xls. The United States is one of 
these parties. Id. 
 33 See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28, Annex I, reg. 4, para. 3(d); see also Becker, supra note 31, at 629. 
MARPOL simply states that the “Port State . . . shall take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail 
until it can proceed to sea or leave the port for the purpose of proceeding to the nearest appropriate repair yard 
available without presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.” MARPOL 73/78, 
supra note 28, Annex I, reg. 4, para. 3(d). 
 34 MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28; see also Becker, supra note 31, at 631. 
 35 See Becker, supra note 31, at 631, 632–33; MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28. 
 36 Becker, supra note 31, at 633 (“[O]ut of 1000 alleged violations that were reported to the IMO, 534 
represented situations in which the flag states had not complied with this notification requirement. Of the 206 
cases that reported some type of action taken, 111 found the vessel innocent or unprosecutable due to 
insufficient evidence. Seventy-seven of the cases resulted in fines, eight resulted in warnings, and ten resulted 
in unspecified actions.” (citations omitted)). 
 37  Scott J. Shackelford, Was Selden Right? The Expansion of Closed Seas and Its Consequences, 47 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 21 (2011). 
 38 Huang, supra note 13. 
 39 Id. 
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provisions are considered customary international law;40 this fact thus provides 
the very avenue by which nonparties such as the United States can be bound.41 
Therefore, because UNCLOS’ customs are accepted as binding international 
law, these provisions can bind even those countries, including the United 
States, that have not ratified the convention. 
Article 194 of UNCLOS requires that ratifying countries “take all measures 
necessary to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment 
from any source” and “ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control 
are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their 
environment.”42 Although UNCLOS’ pollution articles predominantly discuss 
the regulation of oil pollution from vessels,43 Article 194(3) importantly lists as 
under its control these “installations and devices used in exploration or 
exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil,”44 and this 
definition therefore includes the Deepwater Horizon as one of the convention’s 
regulated facilities. In an attempt to ensure compliance from ratifying 
countries, UNCLOS mandates that these countries “adopt laws or regulations 
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising 
from or in connection with sea-bed activities”45 and further states that such 
laws “shall be no less effective than international rules, standards, and 
recommended practices and procedures.”46 
Although UNCLOS directly addresses international regulation of fixed, 
offshore drilling platforms like the Deepwater Horizon, and thus is the most 
comprehensive, current international treaty for oil pollution, its weakness lies 
in that it merely requires states to pass domestic laws that will monitor fixed 
platform pollution.47 It therefore “lacks definitive procedures for determining 
liability, guaranteeing compensation, and enforcing the adoption of 
international rules” if a spill or explosion, caused by one state and affecting 
 
 40 Id. Customary international law is “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” DAVID J. 
BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 16 (2d ed. 2006) (quoting Statute of the International Court 
of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]). 
 41 ICJ Statute, supra note 40; see BEDERMAN, supra note 40, at 16. 
 42 UNCLOS, supra note 18, arts. 194(1)–(2). 
 43 See Melissa B. Cates, Comment, Offshore Oil Platforms Which Pollute the Marine Environment: A 
Proposal for an International Treaty Imposing Strict Liability, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 691, 695–96 (1984). 
 44 UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 194(3)(c). 
 45  Id. art. 208 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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another state, were to occur.48 Unlike MARPOL,49 UNCLOS does not provide 
coastal or port states with any jurisdiction over pollution matters or with any 
other, specific rights to act upon or report to an international regulatory body if 
violations stemming from a fixed platform should affect a neighboring state.50 
UNCLOS, instead, relies solely on domestic laws, which are implemented by 
individual states and coupled with the international cooperation of those states, 
to enforce its provisions.51 
Additionally, because UNCLOS leaves the codification of these laws to the 
discretion of individual state governments, it fails to provide adequately for a 
defined, international pollution standard or an international enforcement body 
that would establish whether these domestic laws sufficiently regulate 
international oil pollution.52 As scholar Barney T. Levantino states, “an 
effective regime to prevent pollution of the oceans requires, in addition to the 
imposition of obligations on parties that use the oceans, the establishment of an 
authority to enforce these obligations with respect to violations which occur 
outside the jurisdiction of any particular state.”53 Without an international 
regulatory body or defined standard of pollution, the responsibility to regulate 
pollution from platforms is placed on individual states, with independent 
regulatory schemes, and thus the international cooperation for which UNCLOS 
strives is lost.54 Therefore, although UNCLOS is progressive in globally 
addressing the increasing prevalence of offshore drilling (and its potentially 
large impact on oil pollution), it yet lacks the specificity in international 
regulation and punishment to be a viable international treaty with the power to 
cover adequately pollution from fixed platforms. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE COMPENSATION REGIMES 
Although this legal background is instructive in understanding state 
liability for pollution, it is also important to look to the pertinent, private 
compensation regimes that were in place at the time of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster. This Comment discusses below the implementation and subsequent 
 
 48 Cates, supra note 43, at 694. 
 49 See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28, Annex I. 
 50  For UNCLOS’ implementation of domestic remedies as opposed to a single, comprehensive 
international standard, see UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 208. 
 51 Id. arts. 208(1), (5); see Huang, supra note 13. 
 52 Cates, supra note 43, at 694. 
 53 Barney T. Levantino, Protection of the High Seas from Operational Oil Pollution: A Proposal, 6 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 72, 89 (1982). 
 54 See Cates, supra note 43, at 695. 
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historical development of both the private compensation regime for vessels—
IOPC—and the private compensation regime for fixed platforms and offshore 
drilling—OPOL. To facilitate an understanding of the Deepwater Horizon’s 
effect on private compensation regimes, this Comment first details the specific 
agreements and regulations of each private compensation regime. 
A. The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds 
1. Structure and Function of IOPC 
The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds is a private 
compensation regime that, in the event of an oil spill from a vessel, imposes a 
liability scheme on its member organizations.55 It originated from two 
international conventions: the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution (the “1969 CLC”) and the 1971 International Convention on 
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage (the “1971 Fund”).56 The 1969 CLC covered pollution damage that 
occurred only in the territory or territorial sea of a party state and limited its 
scope to pollution from tankers.57 It capped liability at either $201 per ship’s 
tonnage or $21.2 million, whichever amount was lower.58 The 1971 Fund 
provided for $95 million in total compensation for victims of such pollution.59 
This liability constituted funds covered by both the ship owner and the 1971 
Fund.60 
These conventions were subsequently amended in 1992 with two 
protocols—the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (the “1992 CLC”) and the 
1992 Fund Convention (the “1992 Fund”).61 Following the advent of these 
protocols, many states signed the 1992 CLC and subsequently denounced the 
1969 CLC, and, in May of 2002, the 1971 Fund ceased to be enforceable 
 
 55 IOPC Introduction, supra note 21. 
 56 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted Nov. 29, 1969, 973 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1969 CLC]; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter 1971 
Fund]; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 1. 
 57 1969 CLC, supra note 56, arts. II, III(1). The convention defines “ship” as “any sea-going vessel and 
any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo.” Id. art. I(1); see also 
EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7. 
 58 1969 CLC, supra note 52, art. V(1); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7. 
 59 1969 CLC, supra note 52, art. V(1); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7. 
 60 1969 CLC, supra note 52, art. V(1); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7. 
 61 1992 CLC, supra note 14; 1992 Fund, supra note 14; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 
1. 
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against its parties.62 The 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund, which entered into force in 
1996, established IOPC for compensation for pollution from vessels.63 IOPC 
draws its financing from any person who received more than 150,000 tons of 
crude and contributing oil from a state that is a party to the 1992 CLC.64 
The 1992 CLC holds its ship owners strictly liable for oil pollution caused 
by their vessels.65 In other words, even if a ship owner is not found to be at 
fault, the 1992 CLC will hold that person liable for the tanker’s damage, 
absent: (1) an act of war or natural disaster, (2) third party sabotage, or (3) 
negligence by public authorities in maintaining navigational aids.66 Because 
liability is calculated proportionally to the tonnage of the offending ship, the 
extent to which an individual ship owner may be held liable is limited.67 
Additionally, the 1992 CLC is more expansive than its predecessors because it 
applies to damage that occurs in a member state’s territory, territorial sea, or 
exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”).68 A ship owner is therefore now potentially 
liable to a member state up to 200 nautical miles from the coast of any member 
state.69 
The 1992 Fund established IOPC to satisfy damage claims from tanker 
pollution that a party state may suffer but that the 1992 CLC cannot fully 
compensate under its liability caps.70 Such partial compensation can arise 
under the 1992 CLC as a result of any of the following conditions: (1) the ship 
owner has invoked one of the exemptions under the 1992 CLC,71 (2) the ship 
 
 62 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 8. Ninety-eight states have signed both the 1992 CLC and the 
1992 Fund, and nineteen states are members of the 1992 CLC but not the 1992 Fund. Id. 
 63 1992 Fund, supra note 14, art. XXVII(2); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3. 
 64 1992 Fund, supra note 14, art. XII; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 5. 
 65 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. IV; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 2. The 1969 CLC 
defines a ship owner as  
a person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of registration, the 
person or persons owning the ship. However, in the case of a ship owned by a State and operated 
by a company which in that State is registered as the ship’s operator, “owner” shall mean such 
company. 
1969 CLC, supra note 56, art. I(3). 
 66 1992 CLC, supra note 14, arts. IV(2)–(3); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 2. 
 67 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. VI; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 2. 
 68 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. III; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 2. The EEZ was not 
included in the 1969 CLC and the 1971 Fund’s jurisdiction. See 1969 CLC, supra note 56, arts. II, III. 
 69 For a definition of the EEZ, see UNCLOS, supra note 18, arts. 55–57. 
 70 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3. 
 71 These exemptions arise when an owner can prove that the damage resulted from: (1) “an act of war, 
hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible 
character,” (2) “an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party,” or (3) “the negligence 
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owner, with his insurance, is unable to financially repay the damages 
demanded of him, or (3) the damage has exceeded the ship owner’s liability 
under the 1992 CLC based on the violating ship’s total tonnage.72 Prior to 
November 1, 2003, the 1992 Fund capped ship owners’ total liability at $204.5 
million.73 On November 1, 2003, the 1992 Fund was prospectively amended, 
with a more than fifty percent increase in compensation, to include a more 
comprehensive liability cap of $307.5 million in total liability.74 
In March of 2005, the 1992 Fund again increased states’ available funds 
when the IOPC implemented the 2003 Supplemental Fund (the “Supplemental 
Fund”).75 Parties to the 1992 CLC were also given the option to enter into this 
additional, supplemental monetary resource.76 If a party agreed to contribute to 
the Supplemental Fund, that fund would, in turn, further increase a party’s total 
liability to approximately $1.2 billion per incident.77 Despite this substantial 
increase in liability, states still have the same incentive to sign the 
Supplemental Fund as would have motivated them to join the 1992 CLC and 
the 1992 Fund: 
If a pollution incident occurs involving a tanker, compensation is 
available to governments or other authorities which have incurred 
costs for clean-up operations or preventive measures and to private 
bodies or individuals who have suffered damage as a result of the 
pollution . . . provided that the damage is suffered within a State 
Party.78 
 
or other wrongful act of any Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other 
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.” 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. III(2); see also supra note 58 
and accompanying text. 
 72 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3. 
 73 1992 Fund, supra note 14, art. VI; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3. 
 74 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3. 
 75 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, May 16, 2003, reprinted in INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, 
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CONVENTIONS AND THE 
SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 53–68 (2005) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL FUND], available at www. 
iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English.pdf ; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 5. 
 76 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 5. 
 77 SUPPLEMENTAL FUND, supra note 75, art. IV(2); see also CLC and Fund Convention, ITOPF, 
http://www.itopf.com/spill-compensation/clc-fund-convention (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). This $1.2 billion 
includes the amounts available under the 1992 CLC. See id. 
 78 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7. 
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To date, twenty-one state parties are members of the Supplemental Fund.79 
Additionally, as of the September 2010 date of the IOPC Secretariat’s report, 
no party has requested to withdraw compensatory funds from the Supplemental 
Fund.80 
Importantly, the Supplemental Fund is strictly a supplement to the 1992 
Fund. It continues to cover the same accidents and events that the 1992 Fund 
already covers—namely pollution by tankers and other vessels.81 Therefore, 
because the explosion involved oil pollution from an offshore platform and not 
a vessel, victims of the Deepwater Horizon disaster are not eligible to obtain 
funds from the Supplemental Fund. 
2. Amendments to IOPC Protocols Prior to the Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster 
From its inception and throughout its history, IOPC’s liability caps have 
been amended in response to each major tanker disaster. This repeated action, 
evidenced in the historical analysis below, reflects the IOPC conventions’ 
constant inability to properly compensate victims of large-scale tanker 
pollution. As discussed previously in Part II.A.1, IOPC originally derived from 
the 1969 and 1971 pollution liability conventions. Prior to 1969, a vessel’s 
tonnage governed a ship owner’s total liability for damage caused by oil 
pollution.82 In 1967, the Torrey Canyon, a British Petroleum supertanker 
carrying 119,000 tons of crude oil, shipwrecked off the coast of England.83 As 
the largest shipwreck of its time, costing approximately $23 million, the Torrey 
Canyon disaster surpassed the compensation scheme laid out in the 
contemporary treaty’s tonnage-liability rules84 and quickly became the catalyst 
 
 79 These parties are Barbados, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. See EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 10. 
 80 Id. at 5. 
 81  SUPPLEMENTAL FUND, supra note 75, at 3.  
 82 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships art. iii, 
done Oct. 10, 1957, [1981] A.T.S. 2 [hereinafter 1957 Convention]; see also Michael Faure & Wang Hui, The 
International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are They Effective?, 12 REV. EURO. 
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVIRO. L. 242, 242 (2003). 
 83 CONG. OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OIL TRANSPORTATION BY TANKERS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF MARINE POLLUTION AND SAFETY MEASURES 1, 34, 285 (1975). 
 84 Id. at 286. 
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for the first major, reactive change in liability caps—the creation of the 1969 
and 1971 conventions and the IOPC compensation regime.85 
Then, in 1978, the Amoco Cadiz spill revealed the 1969 CLC and 1971 
Fund’s “ineffective and inadequate” handling of “major oil spill[s].”86 The 
American-owned Amoco Cadiz sank off the coast of France and released 1.6 
million barrels of oil and affected approximately 125 miles of French 
coastline.87 It became the largest oil spill to date, and the disaster caused 
damages reportedly valued at around $282 million.88 The 1969 and 1971 
conventions covered liability up to only $95 million,89 and thus, within ten 
years of their drafting, these conventions proved highly inadequate in 
responding to the exact disasters they were written to cover. The accident led 
to the drafting of 1984 protocols that again increased liability limits.90 These 
amendments never entered into force, however, because they were contingent 
upon the participation of the United States.91 The United States disagreed with 
the 1984 amendments’ versions of limited liability and therefore declined to 
sign the protocols; thus, this next reactive mechanism was rendered 
ineffective.92 
In 1991, the Cypriot-owned Amoco Milford Haven, carrying nearly a 
million barrels of oil, exploded off the coast of northern Italy.93 Six Cypriot 
crewmembers were killed, and approximately 290,000 barrels of oil escaped 
into the Mediterranean Sea, affecting both Italy and France.94 Following both 
 
 85 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 243; Agustin Blanco-Bazan, The Erika Casualty, Legal Issues from the 
IMO View 2 (International Union of Marine Insurance 2000 Conference, London, Liability Workshop Paper, 
2000). Blanco-Bazan states that, as a result of the Torrey Canyon disaster, the IMO realized the “need to adopt 
a treaty containing international public law rules to regulate the right of the coastal State to intervene in the 
high seas in cases of serious shipping accidents involving pollution damage caused by oil and other hazardous 
and noxious substances” and that “a private law treaty [was] also needed in order to regulate a global liability 
and compensation regime for victims of oil pollution damage.” Id. 
 86 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 245. 
 87 The World’s Worst Oil Disasters: 8. Amoco Cadiz, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/36851250/The_ 
World_s_Worst_Oil_Disasters?slide=4 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 88 Spill Compensation: Cost of Spills, ITOPF, http://www.itopf.com/spill-compensation/cost-of-spills 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 89 1969 CLC, supra note 56, art. V(1); 1971 Fund, supra note 56, art. V(1); see also EXPLANATORY 
NOTE, supra note 21, at 7. 
 90 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 245. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 The World’s Worst Oil Disasters: 10. M/T Haven, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/36851250/The_ 
World_s_Worst_Oil_Disasters?slide=2 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 94 Id. 
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the Haven and Amoco Cadiz disasters, the European members of IOPC again 
demanded higher liability caps so that they would be protected from disasters 
like these, which were proving more internationally prevalent.95 The regime 
responded with the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund, which were almost identical in 
substance and function to the 1984 protocols, except that these newer protocols 
lacked the prior, conditional cooperation of the United States.96 The 1992 
protocols continued to impose strict liability on ship owners, and this liability, 
linked to tonnage, could reach up to $76.5 million.97 
Finally, in 2000, IOPC reacted to the Nakhodka and Erika spills, discussed 
immediately below, and thus implemented the final changes to its protocols 
before the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster.98 In 1997, a Russian-owned 
vessel, the Nakhodka, wrecked off the coast of Japan and dispersed 
approximately 50,000 tons of oil.99 Clean-up claims alone reached $86 million, 
and total pollution and economic damages have not yet been finalized.100 Only 
two years later, Italy’s Erika spilled over 20,000 tons of oil and polluted 
approximately 250 miles of French coastline.101 Although the exact level of 
damages has not been calculated, the French oil company, Total, has already 
been assessed approximately $500,000 for negligent maintenance of the 
ship.102 Final damage estimates are expected to exceed compensation available 
under the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund.103 Responding to these extensive 
pollution incidents, IOPC increased the total liability of an individual party 
under the 1992 CLC and Fund by another fifty percent,104 rendering parties 
strictly liable for up to $115 million in compensation damages for oil pollution 
from tankers.105 
 
 95 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 246. 
 96 Id. 
 97 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. 6(1); see Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 246. 
 98 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 247. 
 99 T.H. MOLLER, THE NAKHODKA OIL SPILL RESPONSE—THE TECHNICAL ADVISER’S PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 
(1997), available at http://www.itopf.com/_assets/documents/paj_97.pdf. 
 100 Id. at 6. 
 101 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 247; Total Guilty of French Oil Spill, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7192085.stm. 
 102 Paris Appeals Court Upholds Total Conviction for 1999 ‘Erika’ Oil Spill, FRANCE24 (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20100330-paris-appeals-court-upholds-total-conviction-1999-erika-oil-spill. 
 103 See 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. 6, paras. 1.1(a)–(b); EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3 
(describing the total liability caps granted under the 1992 protocols); Spill Compensation: Cost of Spills, supra 
note 88. 
 104 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 247. 
 105 See id. 
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Additionally, to combat the continual deficit in compensation liability 
funds that disasters like the Nakhodka and Erika spills have unveiled, the 
European Commission developed an additional, third-tier fund known as the 
Compensation for Oil Pollution in Europe.106 The IMO subsequently adopted 
this model as an opt-in fund for IOPC to supplement the liability caps under 
the current protocols.107 Because it is voluntary and applies only to those 
parties that ratify it, this third-tier fund does not directly affect the 1992 CLC 
and 1992 Fund.108 
Therefore, based on the above historical review, it is clear that IOPC is a 
“reactive” private compensation regime.109 Its protocols have been “amended 
after each new incident” to meet the ever-escalating compensation demands of 
those who have been injured by increasingly “greater oil spills.”110 These 
repeated and reactive amendments have led scholars to question the overall 
validity and effectiveness of liability caps in private compensation regimes, a 
topic that is discussed in Part III.B.1. 
B. The Offshore Pollution Liability Association 
1. Structure and Function of OPOL 
Just as individual states have signed onto IPOC to better regulate pollution 
from tankers, the international community has also established OPOL as a 
means to control pollution from fixed platforms.111 OPOL is an indefinite and 
voluntary compensation regime that regulates liability for oil pollution caused 
by offshore facilities.112 OPOL’s definition of “offshore facility” includes 
wells, drilling units, platforms, offshore storage/loading systems, and pipelines, 
yet excludes any “abandoned well, installation or pipeline; or any ship, barge 
or other craft not being used for the storage of Oil.”113 Its agreement covers 
 
 106 Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Establishment of a Fund for the Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage in European Waters and Related 
Measures, 2002 O.J. (C277) [hereinafter Amended Proposal]; see also Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 248. 
 107 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 248 (explaining that liability caps under this third-tier fund span from 
approximately $5.78 million to the maximum cap of $115 million); see also Amended Proposal, supra note 
106.  
 108 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 248. 
 109 Id. at 249. 
 110 Id. 
 111 About OPOL, supra note 21.  
 112 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (2010), http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/opol-agreement-
oct10.pdf [hereinafter OPOL Agreement]; see also About OPOL, supra note 21. 
 113 About OPOL, supra note 21; see also OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. I(8). 
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offshore facilities located in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, France, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the Isle of Man, and the Faroe Islands,114 
and it limits its jurisdiction to facilities located within the jurisdiction of these 
states.115 OPOL retains jurisdiction over pollution should it disperse from a 
facility within its jurisdiction to an area outside the seas of the nine countries 
listed above, so long as the facility is located within a party state’s 
jurisdiction.116 
Importantly, OPOL does not create a contractual agreement among 
states.117 Instead, it creates a contract among current and future operators of 
offshore facilities maintained for the exploration or production of oil and 
gas.118 Two types of claimants may bring suit against an operator: (1) a “Public 
Authority” (a government, local, or municipal authority) may request 
compensation for remedial costs incurred during pollution prevention, 
mitigation, or elimination measures, and (2) any other party (including a Public 
Authority) may bring a claim for “direct loss or damage caused by 
contamination,” excluding damage to the offending facility.119 OPOL, 
therefore, fashions a means by which entities injured by oil pollution caused by 
an offshore facility can file claims directly against the operators of those 
facilities.120 The agreement mandates that all claims be filed within one year of 
any offending event and that the injured claimant and violating party arbitrate 
all arising disputes in London.121 
 
 114 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. I(4). 
 115 About OPOL, supra note 21. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id.; see also Kissi Agyebeng, Disappearing Acts—Toward a Global Civil Liability Regime for 
Pollution Damage Resulting from Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration, CORNELL L. STUDENT PAPERS 1, 27 
(2006). 
 118 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, pmbl. (stating that “the Parties to this Contract are Operators of or 
intend to be the Operators of Offshore Facilities used in connection with exploration for or production of oil 
and gas”); see also About OPOL, supra note 21; Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 27. OPOL Agreement defines 
an operator as  
a Person which by agreement with other Persons has been authorized to manage, conduct, and 
control the operation of an Offshore Facility, subject to the terms and conditions of said 
agreement, or which manages, conducts and controls the operation of an Offshore Facility in 
which only it has an interest.  
OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. I(10). 
 119 About OPOL, supra note 21. 
 120 Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 27; see About OPOL, supra note 21. 
 121 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cls. IX, XI. 
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Like IOPC, OPOL holds operators strictly liable for damage caused by 
their offshore facilities.122 Again, this strict liability ensures that an operator’s 
liability remains in all instances except for those caused by: (1) an act of war, 
(2) negligence by a third party with the intent to cause damage, (3) negligence 
by a state, or (4) contributory negligence by the claimant.123 The OPOL 
Agreement currently caps any party’s liability at $250 million per incident,124 
and divides this $250-million limit into two subgroups: (1) a $125-million cap 
for remedial damages that can be claimed only by Public Authorities, and (2) a 
$125-million cap for pollution damages.125 The agreement provides for the 
possibility of utilizing any surplus from either subgroup to buttress an 
overpayment in the other.126 For example, if an incident caused $150 million in 
damages due to Public Authorities and only $75 million for pollution damage, 
such an accident would still be fully covered under OPOL. Public Authorities 
can receive up to $125 million “plus that portion, if any, of the maximum 
amount referred to in sub-paragraph 2 [pollution damage] which, under the 
circumstances of the Incident, is not in fact due hereunder.”127 Therefore, the 
$50 million surplus from pollution damages in the aforementioned example 
could be applied to the Public Authorities subgroup to help pay out relief funds 
to victims. Additionally, the agreement mandates that a party pay no more than 
$500 million per year in claims.128 If a party fails to pay any claim required by 
OPOL, the remaining parties to OPOL must contribute to the unresolved claim 
in an amount proportionate to the number of offshore facilities it operates.129 
OPOL’s agreements are enforceable through Article IX and XI’s exclusive 
arbitration provisions.130 Arbitration must occur in London and all disputes are 
“settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said 
rules.”131 OPOL’s main weakness is that it caps liability at $250 million per 
incident. As will be shown below utilizing the Deepwater Horizon disaster’s 
 
 122 Id. cl. IV(A); About OPOL, supra note 21. 
 123 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. IV(B); About OPOL, supra note 21. 
 124 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. IV(A). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 About OPOL, supra note 21; OIL & GAS UK, MANDATORY FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OIL 
INDUSTRY OPERATIONS IN THE UKCS 3, available at http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/templates/asset-relay.cfm? 
frmAssetFileID=1170. 
 129 About OPOL, supra note 21; OIL & GAS UK, supra note 128. 
 130 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cls. 9, 11. 
 131 Id. cl. 9. 
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damage statistics and calculations,132 oil pollution from fixed platforms can be 
even more costly, and as internationally important, as that from tankers. With 
each new, major oil disaster and the subsequent international effects, pollution 
damages will simply exceed compensation caps and require repeated 
amendments to liability limits to compensate effectively those injured by the 
pollution. Additionally, OPOL’s limited jurisdiction, covering pollution caused 
only by offshore facilities located in those countries listed above,133 weakens 
OPOL’s overall international effectiveness. As will be asserted below,134 
especially in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill, a more comprehensive, 
internationally applicable liability scheme for offshore pollution is necessary to 
regulate and prevent major environmental and economic disasters like the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
2. Amendments to the OPOL Agreement 
OPOL’s amendments,135 like those of the IOPC protocols, also indicate the 
“reactive” nature of private compensation regimes to major oil disasters. As is 
examined again in Part III.A below, OPOL, prior to the Deepwater Horizon’s 
explosion off the coast of Louisiana, limited a party’s liability to only $120 
million per incident.136 In an August 2010 emergency meeting in response to 
the Deepwater Horizon incident,137 parties to OPOL amended OPOL’s 
agreement to reflect a new, higher liability cap of $250 million per party per 
offshore oil pollution incident.138 Additionally, OPOL added the current annual 
cap of $500 million per party.139 Similarly to the amendments to the IOPC 
protocols, these changes—which took effect in October of 2010140—were 
therefore “reactive” to the salient and far-reaching effects of the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion. 
 
 132 See infra Parts III.A–.B. 
 133 About OPOL, supra note 21.  
 134 See infra Part III.D. 
 135 1969 CLC, supra note 52, art. V(1); 1971 Fund, supra note 52, art. V(1); 1992 CLC, supra note 14, 
art. VI(1).  
 136 Humphrey Douglas, United Kingdom: Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Likely Impact on UK Regulation and 
Contractual Arrangements, MONDAQ (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=113370. 
 137 ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE COMM., UK DEEPWATER DRILLING—IMPLICATIONS OF THE GULF OF 
MEXICO OIL SPILL, 2010-1 H.C. 450-I, at 4.5.3 (U.K). 
 138 Id. 
 139 OIL & GAS UK, supra note 128, at 3. 
 140 Id. 
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III.  ANALYSIS: DEEPWATER HORIZON’S EFFECT ON THE GAP IN 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF OFFSHORE DRILLING FACILITIES 
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, although the most severe oil spill in 
history—and one of the most widely publicized—has still managed to lodge 
itself in the gap in international regulation of offshore platform pollution. Both 
IOPC and OPOL fail to adequately address the damage already caused by the 
Deepwater Horizon. In addition, the detrimental impacts and the resulting 
pollution that the spill will continue to have on the ecology, tourism, and 
economy of the Gulf Coast states have begun to affect the regulation and 
administration of these compensation regimes. Thus, both IOPC and OPOL 
must substantially alter their structures and agreements if they hope to combat 
potential similar disasters. 
Importantly, the Deepwater Horizon disaster impacted approximately 
68,000 square miles of ocean, roughly comparable in size to the state of 
Oklahoma.141 This far-reaching disaster has caused international scholars and 
lawyers, envisioning potentially greater disasters, to question the adequacy of 
the current international regulation of pollution from fixed, offshore 
platforms.142 In response to this concern, private compensation regimes, which 
are reactive in nature, have altered their compensation schemes, and the 
general attitude toward the value of a global treaty on the subject has also 
begun to shift.143 This Comment examines the effects the Deepwater Horizon 
spill has had on this gap in international law and projects its future effects on 
international regulations of pollution from fixed platforms. Additionally, it 
argues that a global treaty that would impose strict liability on operators for oil 
spills from fixed platforms is necessary to regulate both liability and due 
compensation fully and effectively. 
A. The Deepwater Horizon’s Direct, Evidenced Effects on Private 
Compensation Regimes 
Currently the largest oil spill to date, the Deepwater Horizon disaster has 
impacted more than just ecologies, environments, tourism industries, and 
economies. It has also begun to affect the agreements of private compensation 
regimes, and these modifications to the affairs of private compensation regimes 
 
 141 Justin Gillis, An Oil Slick To Rival Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2010, 1:28 PM), http://green. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/an-oil-slick-to-rival-oklahoma. 
 142 See, e.g., Huang, supra note 13.  
 143 See id. 
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elucidate the greater, long-term impact that the Deepwater Horizon incident 
will likely have on both IOPC and OPOL. Both IOPC and OPOL have 
historically been reactive when responding to each major oil pollution disaster, 
simply updating their protocols and regulations concerning liability caps rather 
than by reevaluating the effect of their regimes.144 With each new and more 
costly accident, these protocols quickly become outdated and insufficient;145 
the respective member parties then demand further increased liability caps to 
better cover the escalating damages.146 These historically “reactive” efforts, 
therefore, reveal private compensation regimes’ heightened, but ultimately 
ineffective, efforts to keep up with the increasingly costly damages incurred 
because of larger tankers and platforms that hold ever-greater quantities of oil. 
For example, in an attempt to mitigate the overwhelming damage caused by 
the Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP allocated $20 billion to finance a relief 
fund to aid those affected by the disaster.147 Twenty billion dollars from one 
party for one incident far exceeded any caps in place by either IOPC or OPOL 
at the time of the disaster. In April 2010, IOPC capped liability for its parties at 
$307.5 million, with an optional fund that totaled liability at $1.2 billion for 
those who chose to enter into the Supplemental Fund.148 When the Deepwater 
Horizon exploded, OPOL had limited a party’s liability to only $120 million 
per party, per incident.149 Responding to the Gulf Coast spill, OPOL’s board 
held an emergency meeting in August 2010 to discuss increasing liability caps 
to $250 million per party, per incident and $500 million per party aggregated 
per year for fixed platform pollution.150 The board subsequently approved the 
caps, and, in October 2010, they entered into force.151 
Although the recent increases in both IOPC and OPOL caps reveal that 
IOPC and OPOL are reactive regarding large-scale disasters, these caps pale in 
comparison to the $20-billion relief fund which BP has agreed to finance. 
History has shown that these simple increases fail to cure the ever-impending 
problem of insufficient liability available under private compensation regimes. 
 
 144 See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See id. 
 147 BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend 
Decisions, BP (June 16, 2010), http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId= 
7062966. 
 148 See EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 5; supra text accompanying notes 21, 73. 
 149 See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 150 ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE COMM., supra note 137, at 4.5.3.  
 151 OIL & GAS UK, supra note 128. 
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With each historical disaster that surpasses the current cap, as evidenced by the 
Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, and Erika spills, and now the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion, the liability schemes of these private compensation regimes 
are inevitably rendered outdated, sometimes before even entering into force,152 
and then are immediately ripe for amendment. 
B. The Deepwater Horizon Disaster’s Potential Effects on Private 
Compensation Regimes 
1. A Proposed Model Eliminating Compensation Caps 
The degree to which the BP compensation fund exceeds the current liability 
caps of IOPC and OPOL153 calls into question the feasibility of liability caps 
for oil pollution from tankers and fixed platforms.154 Economists argue that, 
under limited liability principles, violators are not provided with an 
“appropriate (economic) incentive for prevention” of environmental disasters 
like the Deepwater Horizon explosion.155 Compensation caps on damages 
leave vessel and platform operators less than entirely accountable for their 
actions.156 If operators can avoid part of the cost of their negligence or 
mismanagement of facilities, the balance of costs for these operators therefore 
often can weigh in favor of limiting precautionary measures rather than 
vigilantly monitoring their facilities and relevant safety regulations.157 
One proposal economists recommend for alleviating this problem is for 
private compensation regimes to simply remove all compensation caps.158 By 
eliminating these liability limits, private compensation regimes would hold 
parties fully responsible for all damage they incur and would no longer force 
victims to bear the difference between total damages caused by the operator’s 
pollution and total compensation allowed under the regime. This proposal also 
retains a mandate that installation owners maintain compulsory insurance.159 
Therefore, if a violating party does not have sufficient assets to completely 
 
 152 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 251. 
 153 Although the IOPC Fund does not directly regulate fixed platforms, its model for compensation is 
instructive for future changes in private oil pollution compensation regimes. For a discussion of IOPC and 
OPOL’s liability caps, see supra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2. 
 154 See Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 249. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
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satisfy a claim, the party’s insurance company must remit the remaining 
payment.160 Advocates of this proposal argue that, by implementing these 
safeguards, a total elimination of compensation caps would successfully 
encourage oil operators to regulate their vessels and platforms responsibly 
because parties would be fully, rather than only partially, responsible for any 
damage caused by their facilities.161 
As noted above, BP has financed a $20-billion relief fund to compensate 
those injured by the Deepwater Horizon disaster.162 This amount far exceeds 
IOPC’s $1.2-billion supplemental cap and OPOL’s newly approved $250-
million cap.163 The Deepwater Horizon explosion, originating from a fixed 
platform, is most analogous to a disaster governed under OPOL’s 
guidelines;164 the difference between OPOL’s $250-million cap and BP’s $20-
billion relief fund is stunning. This readily apparent, eightyfold discrepancy 
very likely will cause economists, environmentalists, and other influential 
advocates to reconsider seriously both the efficacy of the caps placed on 
operators by these private compensation regimes and the ability of these 
regimes to compensate victims adequately. It is unlikely, however, that private 
compensation regimes will, as this model recommends, completely eliminate 
compensation caps. Instead, evidence from past oil pollution disasters supports 
the less effective, but more probable, outcome of a continuation in the 
escalation of liability limits for operators of both tankers and fixed platforms—
but possibly at a higher percentage increase than past amendments in light of 
BP’s $20-billion compensation fund.165 
2. A Possible Change in “Abstract Claims” 
In addition to exposing the need for a possible modification in 
compensation caps, the Deepwater Horizon incident highlights the need to 
allow “abstract claims” in a demand for compensation from offending 
operators. The 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund restrict the ability of those injured 
by a party to the CLC so that they may recover only for environmental 
damages of “reasonable measures of reinstatement, either undertaken or to be 
 
 160 Id. at 252. 
 161 Id. at 249. 
 162 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 163 See supra text accompanying notes 77, 124. 
 164  See supra Parts II.A.1 and II.B.1. 
 165 See supra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2. 
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undertaken.”166 Therefore, the 1992 CLC covers only those claims in which 
injured parties can allege that they sustained a “quantifiable economic loss” 
that must be compensated in order to restore the environment.167 Under the 
1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund, injured victims cannot recover compensation 
from violating operators for the “abstract claims” of irreparable harm to the 
environment, including the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land and the 
decrease in the monetary valuation of the environment.168 
In light of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, private compensation regimes 
like IOPC and OPOL may reevaluate their decision to deny compensation for 
these environmentally “abstract claims.” Although recent studies have shown 
that the damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon explosion is not, to date, as 
extensive as originally projected,169 this contentious research has nevertheless 
revealed that its harmful effects have certainly been substantial enough to 
question the continued exclusion of compensation claims like “use and 
enjoyment of,” or “devaluation of,” contaminated land.170 For example, the 
conservative estimates suggest that twenty-six percent of the oil spilled by the 
Deepwater Horizon either washed ashore or remained in a form that could 
cause further damage to Gulf Coast shorelines.171 Despite such a relatively 
small percentage, that total equals “more than 53 million gallons of oil, five 
times the size of the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska.”172 
Specifically, the Deepwater Horizon disaster substantially impacted the 
Gulf Coast states, especially Louisiana and Florida. Releasing more than 185 
million gallons of oil into the proximate waters, it affected fishing and tourism 
 
 166 See E.H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES: STANDING, DAMAGE 
AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS 346 (2001). The 1992 Convention “applies exclusively” to “pollution damage” 
caused in specific areas of the sea. 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. III. “Pollution damage” is defined as either 
the  
loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge 
of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation 
for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited 
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken 
or “the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.” Id. art. II(3). 
 167 BRANS, supra note 166, at 346. 
 168 Id. Instead, as addressed in supra note 166, environmental compensation is limited in the 1992 CLC 
solely to compensation for “costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken.” 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. II(3). 
 169 Gillis & Kaufman, supra note 2. 
 170  Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
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industries, the economy, and the surrounding environment.173 The devastating 
spill threatened eight national parks,174 more than 8,000 species of plants and 
animals, and several thousand marine species.175 Only sixteen percent of the oil 
dispersed naturally, and only seventeen percent was confined using 
containment equipment.176 The Gulf of Mexico is projected to prove more 
resistant than originally anticipated (based on comparisons to the Ixtoc I 
disaster177), but much of this resiliency has been credited to the Gulf’s 
ecological conditions, and not to the spill’s limited effects.178 The Gulf, at 643 
quadrillion gallons, is an extremely vast and adaptive body of water—bacteria 
have evolved to metabolize oil because 690,000 barrels of oil naturally seep 
into the Gulf of Mexico each year, and the Gulf’s warm environment 
encourages these bacteria to metabolize the oil.179 Thus, the Gulf of Mexico’s 
resilience is not applicable to oil pollution disasters that occur in other bodies 
of water; rather its resilience was specific to this accident.180 Had such a 
massive spill occurred in a less resilient ocean, the result could have been more 
disastrous and deleterious to the environment. It is therefore possible that these 
claims concerning the devaluation of land, as well as the use and enjoyment of 
it, may soon be included either as amendments to the 1992 CLC or in a new, 
global treaty regulating oil pollution from fixed platforms. Part III.D below 
considers whether such proposals for a new treaty are relevant and actionable 
under international law. 
3. Inapplicability of Private Compensation Regimes to Some States 
Finally, a massive oil spill like the Deepwater Horizon reminds the 
international community that, because some operators are restricted by 
domestic laws that bar them from entering private compensation funds or 
regimes like OPOL, these regimes can never truly bridge this gap in 
international law or provide a comprehensive, unified system of compensation 
for those injured by offshore operators. For example, in 1990, the United States 
 
 173 Gulf Coast Oil Spill: One Year Later, NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS’N, http://www.npca.org/ 
oilspill (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
 174 Id. 
 175 THOMAS C. SHIRLEY ET AL., BIODIVERSITY OF THE GULF OF MEXICO: APPLICATIONS TO THE DEEP 
HORIZON OIL SPILL 1 (2010). 
 176 Gillis & Kaufman, supra note 2. 
 177 See infra Part III.C.1. 
 178 John McQuaid, The Legacy of the Gulf Spill: What To Expect for the Future?, YALE ENV’T 360 (Aug. 
9, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2302. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
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passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).181 This domestic law mandates 
damage caps different from those found in private compensation regime 
agreements, thus rendering OPA incompatible with such private, international 
agreements.182 Unlike the specifically tailored private compensation regimes of 
IOPC and OPOL, OPA applies both to the owners, operators, or charterers of 
vessels and to the lessees or permit-holders of offshore facilities.183 Under the 
statute, liability per spill can reach up to $22 million for tankers, $75 million 
plus clean up costs for offshore platforms, and $350 million for onshore 
facilities and deep-water ports.184 Additionally, individual states can increase a 
violator’s liability through added state regulations, thus providing for possibly 
unlimited liability for operators of tankers and platforms if they pollute in U.S. 
waters.185 OPA also does not permit parties liable for gross negligence to 
benefit from its limited liability scheme.186 Domestic enforcement 
mechanisms, through civil, administrative, and criminal penalties (in the form 
of both fines and imprisonment), are also available through OPA.187 
Because the United States originally decried the CLC’s imposed liability 
caps and narrow application, yet subsequently implemented a similar structure 
through OPA,188 international lawyers have criticized OPA for enabling large-
scale transporters and facilities (as well as oil companies owning cargo but not 
facilities) to escape legal liability for major spills.189 Despite the possibility for 
increased limits compared to private compensation regimes, OPA is still not 
comprehensive enough to scare operators of oil facilities into “taking all 
 
 181 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006); Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 246; see also 33 U.S.C. § 2704.  
 182 Michael A. de Gennaro, Oil Pollution Liability and Control Under International Maritime Law: 
Market Incentives as an Alternative to Government Regulation, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 265, 269, 272 
(2004); see also 33 U.S.C. § 2704; 1992 Fund, supra note 14, art. VI(3). 
 183 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32); see also de Gennaro, supra note 182, at 273; Larry Schnapf, Oil Pollution 
Control Act: An Overview for the Business Lawyer, BUS. L. TODAY (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.abanet.org/ 
buslaw/blt/content/2010/10/0002a.pdf. 
 184 33 U.S.C. §§ 2704(a)(1), (3), (4); see also Schnapf, supra note 183, at 2. 
 185 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a); see also de Gennaro, supra note 182, at 272, 275; Browne Lewis, It’s Been 4380 
Days and Counting Since Exxon Valdez: Is It Time To Change the Oil Pollution Act of 1990?, 15 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 97, 109 (2001); Schnapf, supra note 183, at 3. However, only eleven states have elected to supplement 
OPA’s regulation scheme with unlimited liability statutes. Id. 
 186 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(A); see also de Gennaro, supra note 182, at 275. Without access to OPA’s 
limited liability, parties guilty of gross negligence could be responsible for the full value of the damages. Id. 
 187 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(6), (7); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); see also Schnapf, supra note 183, at 7–8. 
 188 De Gennaro, supra note 182, at 269. 
 189 For example, despite the fact that in 2003 Exxon Mobil was the “largest transporter of oil on world 
oceans,” OPA was incapable of rendering complete compensation for the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Id. at 273 
n.15. 
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possible precautions to prevent spills.”190 Importantly, OPA, like the private 
compensation regimes, does not entertain proper economic incentives for 
operators to monitor and regulate oil pollution.191 For example, BP earned 
approximately $14 billion in gross profits in 2009.192 Under OPA’s liability 
scheme,193 the maximum liability that the United States could impose upon BP 
equals only a small percentage of one year of BP’s profit. By impacting such a 
minimal fraction of BP’s overall profit margin, OPA provides little economic 
incentive for oil operators to implement potentially costly, yet needed, safety 
and regulatory measures that could help prevent, or at least reduce, the 
disastrous consequences of massive oil spills like the Deepwater Horizon. 
Additionally, domestic pollution regulation (which relies on individual 
states’ domestic laws), like OPA, eliminates the possibility of creating a 
“single forum for adjudicating damage claims” from offshore drilling 
pollution.194 It inherently engenders enforceability problems concerning 
“conflicting laws, forum shopping, and other related enforcement problems” 
both globally and domestically.195 Conflicts between two countries with 
differing liability schemes—for example, one imposing strict liability and the 
other unlimited liability—would increase the desire to forum shop for the most 
favorable jurisdiction, evade proper yet unfavorable jurisdiction, or commit 
other such hedging actions. Therefore, if individual states each create their own 
pollution liability statutes (like the United States did with OPA), it becomes 
increasingly difficult to adopt an effective, globally recognized standard of 
liability, enforcement, or punishment. 
The U.S. Congress, by enacting OPA, failing to preempt state law, and 
declining to join onto a more standardized definition of liability (as found in 
private compensation regimes like IOPC or OPOL) left its individual states 
without a concrete and comprehensive standard by which to establish 
jurisdiction over foreign operators who pollute U.S. waters.196 In addition, state 
courts, due to administrative and legal expenses, delay in the judicial process, 
 
 190 Id. at 275. 
 191 Id. at 276. 
 192 BP Delivers on Promises in “Very Good” 2009 as 4Q Profits Jump 70 Per Cent, BP (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://www.bp.com/extendedgenericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7059471. 
 193 See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 194 De Gennaro, supra note 182, at 275. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 277; see also Damon L. Vickers, Deterrence or Prevention—Two Means of Environmental 
Protection: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Oregon Senate Bill 242, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
405, 421 (1992). 
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and difficulty in obtaining original jurisdiction over foreign parties in order to 
compel foreign violators to submit to individual state liability statutes, truly 
provide little enforcement power under OPA.197 Therefore, without more 
stringent measures, individual domestic laws, like OPA, will neither deter 
operators of vessels and platforms from investing in risky ventures nor prevent 
them from cutting back on safety measures for their facilities. 
Thus, private compensation regimes fail to provide an adequate or 
comprehensive solution for the gap in international law that leaves open 
regulation of oil pollution from fixed platforms. By allowing for only moderate 
compensation caps, regimes like IOPC and OPOL are forced to become 
“reactive.” In response to major oil disasters, these regimes must amend their 
agreements and increase their requisite liability caps so as to sufficiently cover 
the most recent disasters. Additionally, individual states often pass domestic 
laws that conflict with the regulations of these private compensation regimes, 
rendering it impossible for the voluntary agreements of IOPC and OPOL to 
become a globally comprehensive and effective liability scheme. Such 
domestic laws of these individual states further create inconsistencies in 
liability standards, weakening the overall effectiveness of private 
compensation regimes. Because private compensation regimes have proven 
unsuccessful in fully regulating oil pollution from fixed platforms, it is 
necessary to look next at the Deepwater Horizon spill’s impact on international 
treaties as well as to examine a potential global treaty’s ability to fill this gap in 
international law. 
C. The Deepwater Horizon’s Effect on International Law 
1. Disasters with International Implications, Caused by Offshore Oil 
Platforms, Prior to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
Because private compensation regimes have, overall, proven ineffective, 
and because this Comment aims to prove that a global treaty is the most 
effective mechanism to regulate disasters as influential as the Deepwater 
Horizon, this Comment now looks to a similar disaster to reveal the analogous 
lack of guiding, international treaties. The international prevalence of offshore 
drilling platforms has steadily increased in the last thirty years.198 As the 
number of existing offshore platforms increases in the international 
 
 197 De Gennaro, supra note 182, at 277. 
 198 See Cates, supra note 43, at 691. 
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community, the risk of pollution from these newly built platforms rises 
correlatively. For example, in recent history, there have been oil platform 
explosions in the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Persian Gulf.199 The 
extensive oil pollution caused by such platform explosions has revealed that 
“transboundary pollution in the marine environment of neighboring nations” is 
now a real threat to the international environment.200 
For example, in 1977, Ixtoc I, an oil platform operated by a private 
Mexican contractor under contract with a Mexican national oil company, 
exploded in the Bay of Campeche, Gulf of Mexico.201 Ixtoc I released more 
than 3 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, and the resulting damage 
had international implications.202 Although the oil came from a Mexican-run 
oil platform, the pollution still extended far enough to injure the fishing and 
tourism industries of Texas, as well as the surrounding environment.203 
Mexico, however, avoided suit in U.S. domestic courts because it was able to 
rely on U.S. foreign sovereign immunity rules.204 
Due to the lack of relevant international treaties addressing oil spills from 
platforms, the United States could not sue Mexico in an international tribunal 
for the extensive environmental and economic damage that Ixtoc I caused.205 
Although UNCLOS directly addresses the possibility of oil pollution from 
fixed platforms, it leaves the codification of applicable laws to individual 
States and thereby lacks the international mechanism necessary for effectively 
regulating oil pollution.206 More specifically, the United States could not sue 
Mexico under UNCLOS because: 
1. There exists no international responsibility which anyone 
could exercise against Mexico for the blowout of Ixtoc I in 
terms of conventional international law. 
 
 199 See id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 692. 
 202 Id.; BP’s Gulf Battle Echoes Monster ’79 Oil Spill, REUTERS, May 24, 2010, available at http://www. 
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64N57U20100524. 
 203 Cates, supra note 43, at 692; James E. Fender, Note, Trouble Over Oiled Waters:—Pollution Litigation 
or Arbitration—The Ixtoc I Oil Well Blow-Out, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 281, 282–83 (1980).  
 204 BP’s Gulf Battle Echoes Monster ’79 Oil Spill, supra note 202.  
 205  C. Richard Bath, Mexico, the United States and Selected Law of the Sea Issues, 35 INTER-AM. ECON. 
AFF. 1, 21 (1981). 
 206 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes. 
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2. No article on conventional international law obligates 
Mexico to pay any reparations to a state because of pollution 
caused by Ixtoc I. 
 . . . . 
5. To this date there exist 33 international conventions 
covering marine pollution, but none of them apply to Ixtoc I. 
Therefore, there is no existing international law that is 
applicable. 
 . . . . 
7. UNCLOS III asserts that it is the sovereign right of each 
state to exploit its natural resources in conformity with the 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment. 
Mexico has made every effort, at extreme cost, to contain 
the blowout to avoid damage to marine ecology or to other 
states. In so doing, Mexico has complied with international 
law.207 
Therefore, at the time of the Ixtoc I disaster, no international law or treaty 
specifically dictated fault or regulatory procedures that could directly apply to 
a platform-based oil spill with international implications; only domestic law, 
under which Mexico was able to avoid suit,208 would have applied. 
2. Deepwater Horizon’s Detrimental Impact on the International 
Environment Demands an International Treaty 
In the wake of the damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon, those injured 
by the disaster, like those affected by Ixtoc I, sought an international avenue 
through which they could delegate both liabilities and compensation. However, 
as discussed in Parts I.A and I.B above, no international treaty to date 
specifically and effectively addresses this issue. As was the case with Ixtoc I, 
UNCLOS refers to ramifications for oil pollution from fixed platforms, yet still 
fails to provide an international mechanism for regulating oil pollution.209 As 
this Comment has shown, the devastating and far-reaching damages of the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster cannot be adequately regulated by the 
compensation schemes of private compensation regimes like IOPC and 
OPOL.210 As long as such regimes maintain low liability caps, they will remain 
reactive regimes incapable of handling larger oil disasters.211 Additionally, the 
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preclusion of some parties from joining private compensation regimes, due to 
the incompatibility of their states’ domestic laws with the regulations of the 
regimes, forfeits these regimes’ ability to solve comprehensively the gap in 
international regulation.212 Therefore, as the Deepwater Horizon incident has 
helped to reveal, this gap in regulation can be completely satisfied only by 
creating that which is so evidently missing: an international treaty that (1) 
strictly regulates pollution specifically from fixed platforms, and (2) develops a 
framework for implementing such regulation. 
The international community has already begun to address this need for an 
international treaty specifically tailored to fixed platforms. Prior to the 
Deepwater Horizon spill, leading petroleum agencies had planned to hold a 
conference in 2011, in Portland, Oregon, to discuss regulation of oil production 
in the Arctic.213 The American Petroleum Institute and several other U.S. 
agencies were conference sponsors, and the main emphasis of the conference 
was set to center on preparations for drilling in the Arctic.214 However, upon 
realizing the extensive damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon, the agenda 
of the conference was rumored likely to change to discuss ways to regulate 
better and prevent international disasters caused by oil leaking from fixed 
platforms;215 however, although the conference did spend a considerable 
portion of its time discussing the Deepwater Horizon spill, the schedule of the 
conference did not specifically address fixed platforms.216 Currently, rather 
than simply relying on an express agreement like a multilateral treaty, some 
countries (including Norway, Britain, France, and Germany) have volunteered 
assistance and equipment in order to aid the United States’ recovery after the 
Deepwater Horizon spill.217 By beginning this discussion of a more global 
alternative by possibly altering the agenda at the Arctic conference, these oil 
agencies have recognized the inadequacy of the current standards, at least at 
some level. Therefore, the Deepwater Horizon’s pervasive economic and 
financial impact has already begun to modify the desire for a multinational 
agreement concerning liability for pollution from fixed platforms, and this 
action will hopefully catalyze a codified, far-reaching system regulating oil 
pollution from such fixtures. 
 
 212 See supra Part III.B.3. 
 213 Galbraith, supra note 1. 
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D. A Proposal for an International Treaty Imposing Strict Liability 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster clearly evidenced the need for an 
international treaty that effectively resolves the conflicting liabilities operators 
face for oil pollution from fixed, offshore platforms. The most effective 
proposal to regulate such environmental hazards, offered as a solution to better 
regulate accidents like the Deepwater Horizon, advises that states convene at 
an international conference to create a global treaty that would rely on the 
theory of strict liability and that would be applicable in all zones of the sea.218 
The treaty would apply to any state party that maintains jurisdiction over an 
operating, offshore oil platform, and be an instructive guide following the 
aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.219 
1. Strict Liability Under the Treaty 
A global treaty governing fixed platforms must impose strict liability upon 
the operators of platforms to regulate effectively pollution stemming from 
these facilities.220 The tort theory of strict liability is based on the premise that 
a party who “undertakes an ‘abnormally dangerous activity’”221 should be held 
responsible for “liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to 
harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something 
safe.”222 The doctrine holds those who created the risk strictly accountable 
because that person is “best able to predict and allocate the risk of loss” and 
“can spread loss through slightly higher prices to consumers whereas an 
innocent victim cannot.”223 Classic examples of strict liability in tort are found 
in legislation for explosives and the handling of ultra-hazardous substances.224 
Because the drilling of oil is an abnormally dangerous activity—as evidenced 
by the extensive damage caused by disasters like the Ixtoc I and Deepwater 
Horizon explosions—it follows that those working with fixed platforms for the 
purpose of drilling oil should be held strictly liable for any damage caused, 
regardless of the operators’ negligence or lack thereof.225 
 
 218 Cates, supra note 43, at 693. 
 219 Id. 
 220 See id.; Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 34. 
 221 Cates, supra note 43, at 702. 
 222 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009). 
 223 Cates, supra note 43, at 703. 
 224 See generally M. Stuart Madden, Strict Products Liability Under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A: “Don’t Throw out the Baby with the Bathwater,” 10 TOURO L. REV. 123 (1993). 
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Additionally, one important source of international law, “the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations,”226 also indicates that strict 
liability is applicable to fixed platform regulation. For example, several states 
in the United States have passed domestic laws that label the drilling of oil on 
land as “abnormally dangerous.”227 California, concerned that the “drilling of 
an oil well is an ultra hazardous activity because it necessarily involves the risk 
of serious harm to lands, waters, fish, wildlife, and personal property of 
others,” classified the drilling for oil on land as an “abnormally dangerous 
activity.”228 Offshore drilling on fixed platforms raises concerns analogous to 
those presented by California, and thus offshore platform activity should also 
be governed by strict liability rules. The Deepwater Horizon and Ixtoc I 
accidents have proven that oil pollution from offshore drilling can have 
devastating and far-reaching effects upon the environment, fishing and tourism 
industries, and property interests which reach beyond mere national concerns. 
Therefore, parties participating in offshore oil drilling, inseparably related to 
those in landed oil drilling—which several states have already recognized as 
“abnormally dangerous”229—should also be held strictly and internationally 
liable for possible, future pollution incidents. 
Currently enforceable regional treaties concerning the regulation of oil 
pollution also lend credence to the proposal that parties participating in 
 
 226 ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 38. The statute provides four categories of sources in international law: 
(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
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offshore drilling be held strictly liable for their operations.230 The 1976 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore 
Operations (the “1976 Convention”) is applicable only to states bordering the 
North Sea, Baltic Sea, or North Atlantic Ocean, yet it provides an excellent 
model for holding parties strictly liable for offshore drilling operations.231 This 
regional treaty utilizes the theory of strict liability for oil pollution from fixed 
platforms and holds operators strictly liable for any transnational damage that 
may be caused by oil that escapes from an “installation.”232 Importantly, an 
“installation” is defined as “any well or other facility, whether fixed or mobile, 
which is used for the purpose of exploring for . . . crude oil from the seabed or 
its subsoil.”233 The treaty covers pollution that occurs under the jurisdiction of 
a Controlling State.234 It affects the “territory, including the internal waters and 
territorial sea, of a State Party or in the areas in which, in accordance with 
international law, it has sovereign rights over natural resources.”235 The 
operator may escape some or all liability only in extremely exceptional 
circumstances, such as: (1) if damage “resulted from an act of war, hostilities, 
civil war, insurrection, or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable 
and irresistible character,”236 (2) if the well had been abandoned for more than 
five years prior to the accident, or (3) if the damage was caused by the 
victim.237 
2. Jurisdictional Extent of the Treaty 
In addition to concerns with levels and degrees of liability, it is also 
important to consider the extent to which a treaty on pollution from fixed 
platforms should extend its jurisdiction. By proposing a treaty that is global, 
 
 230 Cates, supra note 43, at 697. 
 231 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations art. 18, done May 1, 
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 235 Id. 
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 237 Id. 
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rather than regional, in nature, the treaty’s application is no longer limited to 
those areas “under the direct jurisdiction of individual states,” but rather allows 
the treaty to hold parties strictly liable for damage that they may cause in any 
zone of the sea.238 Scholars have previously argued that a global convention 
that regulates fixed platforms and extends its jurisdiction beyond that of its 
party states is unnecessary because: 
Great geographical differences between various regions make efforts 
towards global cooperation both extremely complicated and 
unnecessary. As the presence of oil rigs and assorted platforms seems 
to be most evident in coastal waters the pollution problems they 
cause are better tackled by regional agreements that take into account 
the different conditions of any particular area.239 
However, as Kissi Agyebeng points out, UNCLOS was passed as a global 
treaty that, as such, regulates activities that occur anywhere in the entirety of 
the oceans.240 The success of UNCLOS, therefore, is instructive that treaties 
regulating pollution on an international scale is, in fact, achievable. A treaty 
like UNCLOS thus exists as a model for a global fixed platform treaty. 
By creating a treaty which can both (1) regulate pollution from offshore 
platforms in maritime zones not traditionally covered by regional treaties or 
national jurisdiction, and at the same time can (2) mandate strict liability and a 
concrete definition of the instances in which parties are liable, this newly 
proposed treaty can eliminate the fundamental problems engendered in 
UNCLOS. Liability then would no longer be left to the discretion of individual 
states; rather, the treaty would engender a “binding and uniform civil liability 
regime with global reach for pollution damage resulting from offshore 
operations.”241 
As previously stated, the Deepwater Horizon explosion released oil into the 
surrounding waters and environment, affecting approximately 68,000 square 
miles of ocean.242 The extent of this maritime reach equaled approximately the 
size of Oklahoma.243 During the height of the disaster, the explosion’s 
repercussions extended to the U.S. federal water boundaries, or the U.S. 
 
 238 Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 5. 
 239 MARIA GAVOUNELI, POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS 43 (1995) (citations omitted). 
 240 Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 5. See also supra Part I.B for a description of UNCLOS and its 
inadequate treatment and jurisdictional aspects of offshore facilities. 
 241 Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 5. 
 242 Gillis, supra note 141. 
 243 Id. 
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EEZ.244 In fact, more than a third of the Gulf of Mexico’s EEZ was closed to 
fishing during the summer of 2010 due to dangerous environmental concerns 
caused by the Deepwater Horizon spill.245 The expansive effects of the disaster 
therefore reveal that an accident caused by a fixed platform could easily extend 
beyond the maritime jurisdiction of a state. If another state’s jurisdiction does 
not overlap or meet that state’s jurisdiction, and if pollution were to seep 
beyond an EEZ into the high seas, a global treaty that did not cover all zones of 
the sea would allocate some pollution left by a fixed platform outside the 
jurisdiction of the treaty and leave little or no incentive for a responsible party 
to repair the damage. Therefore, it is imperative that a global, uniform, and 
jurisdictionally all-encompassing treaty be considered to fill this gap in 
international law. 
3. Parties to the Treaty 
Another important aspect to consider when drafting a treaty is whom the 
treaty would bind. By using the 1976 Convention, the Civil Liability 
Conventions, and other similar conventions and agreements regulating oil 
pollution as guides,246 individual states would be made parties to the global 
treaty and operators of the offending oil platforms would remain liable for any 
damage incurred by oil pollution originating from the operator’s facilities in 
violation of the treaty. Although the operators would not be signatories to the 
treaty, they would still be bound to the terms of the treaty as the nationals of 
state parties. States often impose domestic legislation in order to codify into 
their domestic law the regulations found in treaties to which states are 
parties;247 here, therefore, the signatory states would impose domestic 
legislation binding the operators to the terms of the global treaty. An operator 
would be defined similarly to the 1976 Convention as a “person, whether 
licensee or not, designated as operator for the purposes of this convention by 
 
 244 Fishery Closure Boundary as of 6pm Eastern Time 21 June 2010, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/deepwater_horizon/BP_OilSpill_FisheryClosureMap_062110.png (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 245 Deepwater Horizon Santa Rosa County Action Plan Update #44, OILSPILLNEWS, http://www. 
oilspillnews.net/oil-spill-clean-up/deepwater-horizon-santa-rosa-county-action-plan-update-44 (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2011); see also Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Fisheries Closure and Other Information, NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/deepwater_horizon_oil_spill.htm (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2011). 
 246 See 1976 Convention, supra note 231, pmbl.; 1969 CLC, supra note 56, pmbl.; 1992 CLC, supra note 
14, pmbl. 
 247  See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist 
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1998). 
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the Controlling State, or, in the absence of such designation, the person who is 
in overall control of the activities carried on at the installation.”248 States 
would, therefore, not be liable for damages caused by individual operators; 
instead, the treaty would hold operators located in party states liable for their 
offshore operations. 
4. Limits on Liability Under the Treaty 
The 1976 Convention is also an instructive model on how to structure 
compensation caps in an international treaty. It imposes compensation caps, 
similar in theory but different in implementation, to those found in the IOPC 
and OPOL agreements.249 The 1976 Convention creates a committee, 
composed of one representative from each state party, which may propose at 
any time to increase these liability caps.250 A vote from three-fourths of the 
state party members can ratify such a proposal.251 Such a rulemaking body, 
codified in the treaty, allows the treaty to handle, adaptively and more 
adequately, increasingly expensive and extensive disasters caused by fixed 
platforms like the Deepwater Horizon explosion. The 1976 Convention even 
allows for unlimited liability in limited circumstances: 
1. This Convention shall not prevent a State from providing for 
unlimited liability or a higher limit of liability than that currently 
applicable under Article 6 for pollution damage caused by 
installations for which it is the Controlling State and suffered in that 
State or in another State Party; provided however that in so doing it 
shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality. Such provision may 
be based on the principle of reciprocity. 
2. The courts of each State Party shall apply the law of the 
Controlling State in order to determine whether the operator is 
entitled under the provisions of this Article and paragraph 1 of 
Article 6 to limit his liability, and, if so, the amount of such 
liability.252 
This model evidences that it is certainly possible for parties to be held fully 
liable for damage caused by their installations. Its adaptive amendment 
structure—although seemingly similar to what the “reactive” private 
 
 248 See 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 1(3). 
 249 Id. art. 6; see Dubais, supra note 233, at 66. 
 250 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 9; see also Dubais, supra note 233, at 66. 
 251 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 9; see also Dubais, supra note 233, at 66. 
 252 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 15; see also Dubais, supra note 233, at 73. 
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compensation regimes have historically done in response to large pollution 
disasters—would be easier to implement because the treaty codifies a 
committee to recommend amendments.253 This scheme would therefore be 
ideal for a global treaty regulating oil pollution from offshore platforms. 
5. Provisions for Non-economic Damages Under the Treaty 
In addition to provisions that mandate strict liability, global jurisdiction 
over the sea, and compensation caps that can be amended by super-majority 
vote, a global treaty that properly regulates oil pollution from fixed platforms 
must also provide compensation for victims for both economic and non-
economic damages. As discussed above, current compensation schemes 
provide only for economic damages suffered by victims of oil pollution.254 
However, the Deepwater Horizon disaster and its devastating impact on the 
Gulf of Mexico’s tourism, fishing, and environmental industries have clearly 
indicated the substantial impact a massive oil spill from a fixed platform can 
have on the “use and enjoyment of” or “devaluation of” land.255 
It is therefore imperative to define “pollution” in this global treaty so as to 
include “devaluation of land” and the loss of “use and enjoyment of land.” The 
1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund currently limit the definition of “pollution 
damage” to include only the “costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement 
actually undertaken or to be undertaken,”256 and thus fail to provide adequate 
compensation for these “abstract claims” that spills like the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster clearly can and do create.257 To compensate victims 
effectively and fully, a global treaty must therefore provide for instances when 
land can no longer be enjoyed as a tourist beach, a fishing location, or wildlife 
habitat. Without defining “pollution damage” to include these non-economic, 
“abstract claims,” a global treaty regulating oil pollution from fixed platforms 
will still fail to leave victims fully recovered after massive oil disasters. 
6. Summary Remarks 
By (1) holding parties strictly liable for their abnormally dangerous oil 
drilling, (2) limiting compensation while providing a straightforward and 
 
 253  1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 9. 
 254 See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 255 See supra notes 166–75 and accompanying text. 
 256 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. III(2); see supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 257 See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. 
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accessible means for adapting the caps, and (3) leaving an open avenue for 
unlimited liability in certain instances, the 1976 Convention provides an 
excellent model for an international treaty that is capable of regulating offshore 
platforms and being applied globally.258 After the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
it has become readily apparent that, to help compensate victims of such 
disasters, the international community needs a mechanism more effective than 
the private compensation regimes. A global treaty—which imposes strict 
liability on the responsible party regardless of the maritime zone to which the 
damage extends, and that contains reasonable, adaptive compensation caps that 
can be increased by a vote of the parties (with the possibility of unlimited 
liability)—is the best solution to regulate disasters like the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion. Additionally, in order to fully compensate victims and hold 
operators completely liable, such a treaty must define “pollution damage” so 
that operators are liable for non-economic damages, such as devaluation of 
land. Fortunately, international actors have now begun to realize the need for 
such a regulatory scheme.259 
CONCLUSION 
As the analysis above has evidenced, the regulatory schemes currently in 
force, implemented by both private compensation regimes and international 
treaties, fall short of addressing the crucial gap in international law concerning 
pollution from fixed platforms. The staggering size of BP’s $20-billion relief 
fund, established to compensate those affected by the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, coupled with the widespread effects of the 
disaster, have emphasized the importance of filling this gap and have called 
into question the methods available to seek compensation from operators of 
fixed platforms. Private compensation regimes currently fail to compensate 
adequately those injured by oil spills from fixed platforms, and it has become 
readily apparent that contemporaneous damage caps have historically fallen 
well below the requisite compensation needed to satisfy all injuries.260 Simple 
increases in compensation caps in response to each new incident are not 
sufficient remedies. Instead, a global treaty, imposing strict liability and 
creating flexible compensation caps with the added possibility for unlimited 
liability, is necessary in order to fully resolve this gap in international law. 
 
 258  1976 Convention, supra note 231, arts. 3, 7, 15. 
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With the power of a global treaty of strict liability, which would “regulate 
the entirety of the oceans”261 and encompass both the economic and non-
economic impacts of each spill, states would be able to more uniformly predict 
their liability for oil pollution and could better prepare so as to avoid further 
disasters from offshore platforms. Additionally, a global treaty would provide 
for a consistent standard of enforcement against offending operators and would 
remove any confusion concerning liability limits and compensation avenues.262 
However, despite the stirrings among the international community for a 
multinational treaty that directly addresses pollution from offshore platforms, 
the most likely, although less preferable, outcome is a simple increase in 
compensation caps for private compensation regimes.263 Realistically, although 
a treaty would more successfully create uniformity in pollution and liability 
standards, it is unlikely that all states would sign a strict liability treaty that 
would include provisions on compensation caps. The convention and 
subsequent treaty would likely, however, garner sufficient approval to be 
relatively effective, because it would concern the narrow, and thus “feasible,” 
topic of oil pollution from offshore platforms.264 However, some states, like 
the United States, have imposed domestic laws (such as OPA) that are 
incompatible with liability caps.265 These states would be unable to adhere to 
such a treaty without repealing their domestic laws, a highly unlikely outcome. 
To make this treaty more palatable to states like the United States, it would 
have to allow for significant reservations to certain portions of the treaty, 
particularly the liability caps, so that the treaty would not violate current 
domestic laws. However, too many reservations from the treaty would negate 
its necessary purpose of creating a uniform, global standard of liability for 
regulation of oil pollution from fixed platforms. 
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, in order to regulate offshore 
platform pollution, the international community will, probably and regrettably, 
continue its historical trend and converge on an imperfect solution. The 
international community will likely further increase the private compensation 
 
 261 Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 5. 
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regime compensation caps, with potentially a greater percentage increase in the 
wake of the $20-billion compensation funds allocated for the Deepwater 
Horizon spill.266 However, without a global treaty enforcing clear and uniform 
regulations, accidents like the Deepwater Horizon will continue to leave states 
without sufficient direction. States will continue to implement varying systems 
that regulate potential international disasters from fixed platforms, and this 
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